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Abstract 
 
This working paper maps and assesses the institutional and organisational structure of the 
Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), what actors and stakeholders are involved in the policy- 
and decision-making processes, and draws some lessons for future development corridors and 
spatial development initiatives (SDIs) in the broader Southern African region.  
The analysis reveals that the institutional structure of the MDC - which is based on such aspects 
as ‘political champions’, ‘fast-tracking’ of project design and implementation, the crowding-in of 
private investment and a minimalist approach to institutions - is designed for the facilitation of 
‘bankable’ private investments projects and public-private partnerships (PPPs), but contains 
several institutional and organisational weaknesses which have negative consequences for 
broader ‘development’ goals, job creation and the integration of provincial and local 
governments and communities in the process. These drawbacks in combination with the 
radically different conditions prevailing in the neighbouring countries suggest that the MDC 
approach needs to be considerably revised if it is to be applied to regional SDIs, especially if 
these are aiming beyond transport routes and huge investment initiatives. 
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The Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) programme was initiated by the South African 
Government in 1995. It represents a new economic development paradigm, centred on a 
movement away from the protected and isolated approach of the apartheid era towards one 
which seeks to enhance global competitiveness, foreign investment, regional economic 
integration and a more diversified ownership base. The SDI programme is intended as the 
practical implementation, on a spatial (‘micro-regional’/provincial) level in contrast with a sectoral 
level, of the South African government’s macro-economic strategy as set out in its Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy.  
The SDIs are targeted, short-term and often extremely comprehensive initiatives, driven by 
private capital, designed to facilitate global competitiveness, access to global capital and 
investment, infrastructural development and ‘sustainable’ job creation in certain specific spatial 
locations in South Africa, as well as in the broader Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region, which have unrealised economic potential due primarily to apartheid and to a 
range of other historical and political reasons, (Jourdan 1998: 718). In effect the SDIs are 
extremely comprehensive investment projects, which reconfigure whole areas of South Africa and 
the neighbouring countries.  
Up until late 2000, twelve SDIs have been identified or established in South Africa, of which 
some involve neighbouring countries: Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), Phalaborwa SDI; 
Lubombo Initiative; Platinum SDI; Coast-2-Coast SDI; Richards Bay-Empangeni SDI; 
Pietermaritzburg/Msunduzi SDI; Blyde River SDI; West Coast Investment Initiative; Fish River SDI: 
Wild Coast SDI; and Hiveld (Gauteng) SDI (SDI, 2000a).1 There are also far-going plans on SDIs 
and development corridors in the broader Southern African region. 
This study concentrates on what is marketed as the ‘flagship’ of the SDI programme, the MDC. 
Following the terms of references the objectives of the study are to:  
· Map the institutional and organisational landscape that surrounds the MDC. 
· Sketch the overall implementation and planning process of the MDC. 
· Identify what actors and stakeholders are involved in the institutional arrangements and 
implementation processes. 
· Track and analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional and organisational 
structure of the MDC. 
· Draw lessons for future development corridors and SDIs in the broader Southern African 
region. 
With the addition of a Section on concepts and perspectives (Section 2) and one that briefly 
introduces the MDC (Section 3), the study is roughly structured according to this list of 
objectives.  
The field of study is comprehensive, and in order to maintain a clear focus, some aspects will be 
given less consideration. Detailed research has been conducted on the public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) of the MDC, with emphasis on the Witbank-Maputo N4 toll road (Taylor 2000), so these 
arrangements will only be briefly touched upon here. For space limitations the processes 
surrounding the Mozambique Aluminium Smelter (Mozal) project and Industrial Development 
Zones (IDZs) will only be a secondary focus.  
                                                 
1 In February 2000, the portfolio of projects of seven of South African SDIs had identified nearly 800 investment opportunities, 
valued at a total of more than 32 billion USD, with a (stated) capacity to generate more than 85 000 new jobs (SDI, 2000b). 
These mature SDIs are MDC, Lubombo, Fish River, Richards Bay-Empangeni, West Coast and Phalaborwa. Even if all these 
investment projects will not be implemented, many are already in the process of being implemented and taken together they will 
have a significant economic impact. 
1. Introduction 
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The research is based on primary data collected through interviews2 with public and private 
stakeholders involved in the MDC process during a two-week field trip to Gauteng, Mpumalanga 
and Maputo in April 2000. Other sources include official documents and reports (many gathered 
from the SDI web site3) as well as research and media articles on the topic.  
2. Concepts and perspectives4 
The conceptual landscape in the field is ambiguous and needs to be elaborated upon. The key 
concept of  is frequently used without precise specification, and sometimes it is 
confused with organisation which further blurs its meaning. The term institution contains several 
different meanings. In the most general sense, it refers to the guiding norms and frameworks - 
formal or informal - for human action that are the outcome of social practices and patterns of 
interaction that are regularly and continuously repeated and have a major significance on the 
social structure.5 This is the general definition guiding analysis in this study.  
An organisation is conventionally defined as ‘a formal, continuous structure established by 
agreement between members with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership’ 
(Archer 1992: 2). Building on this notion, an organisation involves:  
· specified aims, functions and activities;  
· membership (individual or collective); and  
· its own formal, permanent structure (that is a constitution and administrative structure to 
order responsibilities and carry out its functions). 
Although there is a close relationship between the two concepts, they must not be mixed, 
because then not only is the content of institutions reduced but also the concept of organisation 
is widened so that it looses some of its operational significance. Examples of the distinction 
between the two concepts are shown by the fact that marriage is an institution while the family is 
its organisational manifestation; the market is an institution while the firm is an organisation; 
sovereignty is an institution while the state, in this respect, is to be seen as an organisation 
(Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist 2000: 6). As Carlsson and Wohlgemuth (1996: 6) correctly point 
out:  
‘organisations are part of the fabric of institutions, but they are not 
institutions themselves ... institutional development means much more than 
just structural or functional changes of an organisation. It also involves social 
change. Institutional development is therefore a much more profound 
process that organisation development’. 
Network is another fruitful concept. What all networks have in common is a set of objects, or 
‘nodes’ (cities, organisations, individuals) tied together in a connective structure by ‘links’ (air 
routes, lines of decision-making, communication links). A network is often decentralised and 
horizontally rather than hierarchically organised. Often it lacks a formally coordinated ‘centre’ or 
mechanism, which distinguishes it from an organisation (bureaucracy and hierarchy) (Castells 
1996). Similarly to organisations, networks are also part of the fabric of institutions, but they are 
                                                 
2 See Appendix (list of interviewees).  
3 The SDI web site refers both to www.sdi.org.za and www.dbsa.org/sdi, and all documents taken from this site are, for matters of 
convenience, refered to as SDI, with full titles provided in the list of references.   
4 This section draws on Söderbaum (1999). 
5 Archer (1992: 2) defines an institution as ‘the collective forms or basic structures of social organization as established by law 
or human tradition.’ Gunnarsson (1993: 43) refers to the ‘rules, norms and customs and their enforcement characteristics, which 
determine rights and obligations in the interaction between people.’ 
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often too flexible and functional to be considered institutions themselves. Nevertheless, there are 
some interesting similarities between networks and institutions, which should be highlighted. Both 
concepts draw attention to the patterns of interaction and social relationships among actors 
within a social structure, and how communication, voluntary cooperation and social trust are 
established and spread (Smith Ring 1996: 20). In so doing they transcend the tangible structures, 
‘organisation’ and formally coordinated organisational mechanisms of and in society. 
Although the concept of institution has always remained part of the social sciences, ever since 
the 1950s there has been an unfortunate and often misleading tendency to consider political, 
economic and social life as ‘non-institutional’. Institutions have simply been portrayed as arenas or 
‘theatres’ on which behaviour is driven by more fundamental factors. In neo-classical economics, 
for instance, it has led to institutions being taken as ‘given’, as constants rather than variables. 
Since the late 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, institutions have regained a prominent role in 
the social sciences, giving rise to a great variety of revitalised and new approaches to institutional 
analysis, such as new institutional economics, neo-institutionalism, new institutionalism, neo-liberal 
institutionalism, sociology’s institutionalism and so on (cf. March et al 1989; North 1990; Bardhan 
1989; Gunnarsson 1993; Finnamore 1996). The objective here is not to compare and test 
different institutional perspectives and theories. Considering the pressing lack of research on the 
MDC, especially its institutional and organisational aspects, the use of parsimonious causal theory 
is simply premature. At the present stage of research, the somewhat basic point of departure is 
that ‘institutions matter’. The analysis is conducted through an ‘institutional prism’, which is based 
on the conceptualisations made previously and the assumption that institutions shape 
performance and outcome; that is institutions are endogenous rather than exogenous forces. To 
put it differently, the management of MDC and how various actors and policy-makers relate to 
one another in terms of institutions and organisation are important matters that need to be 
investigated.6  
3. Objectives of the MDC 
The MDC was set in motion in August 1995 by the Ministers of Transport of South Africa and 
Mozambique, Mac Maharaj and Paulo Muxanga, when they agreed to revitalise a corridor and 
cross-border relationship which effectively has existed for more than a century.7 The MDC was 
initiated by these leading figures, with the active support from President Mandela and President 
Chissano and importantly also the first Premier of Mpumalanga, Matthews Phosa.8 The 
Department of Transport in the two countries continue to play important roles but the MDC has 
subsequently become the most high-profile project of the South African SDI programme, which is 
coordinated by the Department of Transport and Industry (DTI).  
                                                 
6 In this context it is fruitful to make a distinction between two broad approaches to institutional analysis (which both endogenise 
institutions). On the one hand there is the historical and sociological approach in the tradition of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, 
which emphasises the durability of institutitions and their role as regulators and transmitters of social relationships. The other 
approach, which is mainly associated with welfare/development economics and public policy, is based on the assumption that 
preferred outcomes and development can be achieved through manipulation of the social context and here institutions are seen 
as instruments of reform. There is no need to be dogmatic about which of the two approaches to prefer, although it should be 
noted that the historical-sociological view to institutional analysis transcends ‘problem-solving theory’ and also allows for an 
understanding of structural transformation (that is more holistic and ‘critical theory’). There has furthermore proved to be a 
tendency of mixing the concept of institution with organization in the approach associated with welfare economics and public 
policy (Moore et al, 1995). 
7 See Lundin and Söderbaum (2001) for the historical construction of the Maputo corridor.  
8 It should be noted that already in 1994 in his inaugural speech as Premier of Mpumalanga, Matthews Phosa, outlined the idea 
of a revived Maputo Corridor (South Africa Report No 2. 1998: 24). 
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The MDC is based on the vision to revitalise the axis between the economic heartland of South 
Africa in Gauteng, the Mpumalanga province (former Transvaal) and the city and port of Maputo. 
The project is considered to be important for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment 
growth, increasing local and foreign investments and export growth in both countries, but also as 
a means to contribute to other key policy areas such as international competitiveness, regional 
economic integration and a broadening of the ownership base. The MDC is based on four key 
objectives:  
· To rehabilitate the primary infrastructure network along the corridor, notably road, rail, port 
and dredging, and border posts, with the participation of the private sector in order to have 
minimum impact on the fiscus.  
· To maximise investment in both the inherent potential of the corridor area and in the added 
opportunities, which the infrastructure rehabilitation will create, including the provision of 
access to global capital and facilitation of regional markets and regional economic 
integration. 
· To maximise social development, employment opportunities and increase the participation of 
historically disadvantaged communities.  
· To ensure sustainability by developing policy, strategies and frameworks that ensure a 
holistic, participatory and environmentally sustainable approach to development (SDI 1999a). 
At the MDC investors’ conference held in May 1996, which marked the official launch of the 
MDC, 180 project proposals were presented to the investors, with a value of nearly 7 billion USD 
and with the stated potential to generate up to 35 000 jobs. The MDC thus contains a very 
comprehensive investment portfolio, and with regard to the rehabilitation of primary 
infrastructure, the following projects, with a total estimated value of 661.5 million USD, should be 
mentioned:  
· Witbank-Maputo N4 Toll Road (the first major PPP, concessioned for 30 years to a private 
sector consortium, TransAfrica Concessions, TRAC, on the basis of build, operate and 
transfer, BOT). 
· Rehabilitation of the port of Maputo.  
· Establishment of a public/private company to manage, operate and maintain the southern 
Mozambique rail network. 
· A single facility/one-stop Border Post at Ressano Garcia/Komatipoort. 
· Of the other investment projects the most comprehensive are  
· Mozambique Aluminium Smelter (Mozal) (with an estimated value of 1.3 billion USD). 
· Maputo Iron and Steel project (1.5 billion USD). 
· Pande/Temane Gas (250 million USD).  
There are also a significant number of other investment projects, in fields such as mining (a 
magnetite, vanadium and heavy minerals project), energy, chemicals, manufacturing (agro-
industry), agriculture (a fertiliser plant), forestry (a project by the conglomerate Sappi) and tourism 
(eco-tourism, lodge and game-park development) and so on (Maputo Development Corridor 
1999). 
4. The institutional landscape surrounding the MDC  
This Section attempts to ‘map’ the institutional and organisational landscape of the MDC, and the 
main actors involved in driving the policy- and decision-making process. This Section and Section 
5, which outlines the particular planning and implementation process of the MDC, are descriptive 
while a deeper assessment of the quality of the institutional set-up is provided in Section 6. 
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The SDI programme is coordinated by the intersectoral and broadly based Overall SDI 
Coordinating Committee (OSDICC), which feeds into a new inter-ministerial Cabinet Investment 
Cluster (CIC). The mandate of the CIC is to facilitate national and provincial coordination of 
investment promotion. It is to give content to the notion of cooperative government between the 
various spheres and levels of government; and promote coordinated national government 
initiatives relating to the provinces (that is bridge the gap between the national and provincial 
economic development programmes). The CIC draws together representatives from a wide range 
of central government departments, with an emphasis on those whose portfolios are related to 
infrastructure and economic development. It is a powerful forum, which reports directly to the 
Cabinet. The CIC has proved important when rapid decisions need to be made to facilitate large 
new investments. Through the OSDICC and CIC, the SDIs have been something of a test case for 
interdepartmental cooperation and coordination in South Africa.  
OSDICC is chaired by the Deputy Director-General (currently Paul Jourdan) in charge of the  
Special Projects Directorate of the DTI, which is the lead agency of the SDI Programme. Meetings 
of the OSDICC are attended by all SDI project managers as well as a broad range of senior 
representatives from national government departments and parastatals involved in the SDI 
process. It includes representatives from most government departments, the parastatal finance 
and investment agencies (including the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Investment 
South Africa and the Industrial development Corporation (IDC)), Transnet, Portnet and Spoornet, 
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Agricultural Research Council. 
The parastatal development finance agencies have been active participants from the start of the 
programme. This is particularly the case of the DBSA which has seconded staff ands offices to 
project managers, housing budgets and providing legal support in terms of contracting and 
auditing etc. The IDC has been engaged in identifying ‘bankable’ investment projects, while CSIR 
has re-oriented some of its activities to support the programme (cf. Hall 1998) 
Initially OSDICC used to meet every three weeks, which however became difficult to maintain 
because of the logistics of all the participants getting to a single location so frequently. The 
number of participants increased hand in hand with new SDIs. For these and other reasons, the 
OSDICC was then split into two entities: firstly, the coordination committee of the so-called 
resource–based SDI’s and secondly the Regional SDI Committee (RESDIC). These two 
committees meet much more infrequently and according to Dave Arkwright ‘in retrospect most of 
us miss the regularity of the OSDICC process’ (personal communication, 27 November 2000). 
Another change of the institutional landscape during 2000 is that the Special Projects 
Directorate of the DTI has been demobilised and the coordination of the SDI programme has 
instead become the responsibility of the DBSA. As mentioned previously, DBSA has always been 
directly involved in the SDI programme. This involvement has also served to remove the 
programme to a distance from direct control by DTI - something regarded as necessary to move 
away from bureaucracy and to enable the programme to have a measure of independence form 
direct public policy. This independence has thus been further strengthened through the increased 
responsibility of DBSA for the SDI programme.  
One novel feature of the ‘SDI methodology’ is that each SDI has (at least) two so called political 
champions. Political champions are high-ranked elected politicians at the national and provincial 
level - who can ensure political commitment and practical support for the process internationally, 
within the government as well as to local and provincial stakeholders, thereby proactively taking 
on the attendant risks of the gigantic initiatives. In the case of the MDC, there has in effect been a 
large number of high-ranked political champions involved. The political support and commitment 
ensured from the highest possible level, by President Mandela, President Mbeki and President 
Chissano, has undoubtedly provided political impetus to the MDC, while at the provincial level 
the (former) Premier of Mpumalanga, Matthews Phosa, was a committed political champion from 
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its inception. The political commitment provided by the Ministers of Transport of South Africa and 
Mozambique, Mac Maharaj and Paulo Muxanga, have also been catalytic, as well as that by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry in South Africa, Alec Erwin.  
The project manager is the person chiefly responsible for implementing the SDI. In international 
SDIs, such as the MDC, there should be a project manager in each participating country. The 
South African MDC project manager (Dave Arkwright) is employed by and accountable to the 
DTI, while in Mozambique, the project manager (Franscisca Soares) is employed by and 
accountable to the Ministry of Transport and Communications. According to the South African 
SDI methodology, it is the task of the project manager to put together a technical team , made up 
of officials from government and parastatals as well as consultants and other relevant experts, 
who then should provide the expertise needed to ‘drive’ the MDC process during the initial 
stages. These project and task teams should be dissolved when their work has been completed. 
The set up, project identification and launch of the MDC process is driven by a loose and fluid 
network, consisting of the political champions, the different line departments involved in the 
process (mainly transport, and trade and industry) the project managers and the technical teams, 
whereas at later stages the administration and project implementation is (supposed) to be 
decentralised and ‘handed over’ (during the ‘exit’ phase) to the provincial and local institutions, 
particularly their investment promotion agencies, which then become the key drivers in the 
project (see Section 5).  
On the provincial level there is an intersectoral Maputo Development Corridor Provincial 
Technical Committee (PTC) (Mitchell 1998: 760). The PTC is chaired by the Chief Director of 
Economic Affairs in Mpumalanga, who is the officer responsible for the MDC provincial 
processes. The committee coordinates the activities of different parts of the provincial 
administration, and it looks at environmental/strategic issues, agriculture, roads and transport, 
local government, tourism and small, micro and medium enterprises (SMMEs). The PTC consists 
of representatives of most departments in provincial government but also several representatives 
of national government. It should be recognised that officials from the Northern Province also 
participate in the PTC. Due to capacity constraints in Mpumalanga, there has been various 
sources of financial and technical assistance, creating resources for a number of specialised 
committees and teams. For instance, the World Bank has been supportive of the Strategic 
Environmental Management Plan (SEMP) in Mpumalanga. A provincial support programme for 
the MDC has also emerged, which conducted a number of important studies on environment, 
SMMEs, sector planning studies in agriculture and tourism.  
At later stages, the Mpumalanga Investment Initiative (MII) has become a key driver in 
contributing to investment implementation in the Mpumalanga province. The MII is a one-stop 
investment agency, focussing on investment promotion and assistance to potential investors. It 
offers services such as:  
· market information;  
· facilitation with feasibility studies;  
· assistance with application of incentives;  
· relocation assistance;  
· facilitation of finance;  
· assistance with work permits;  
· assistance in obtaining factory space/land;  
· joint venture facilitation; fast-tracking of applications; and  
· assistance with exports from Mpumalanga.  
Parallel institutional and organisational structures should be present in the other participating 
countries, at least in Mozambique. However, implementation and institutional development has 
been lagging behind in Mozambique, and decision-making has remained centralised to the 
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President and a few ministries/ministers, particularly the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, the Department of Public Works and the Road Authority. The Investment 
Promotion Centre of Mozambique has also been involved in the process and it performs similar 
duties as the MII in Mpumalanga and Investment South Africa. One indicator of the delayed and 
weak institutional structure in Mozambique is that the project manager was not operational until 
March 1999 and faced large capacity and resource constraints. There are also very weak 
structures that can enable the integration of the provinces in decision-making. In essence, there is 
yet no structure in Mozambique comparable to the South African OSDICC, the CIC or the DTI 
Special Projects Directorate/DBSA SDI Unit. However, attempts are now being made at 
establishing a somewhat similar structure through the Bureau for the Coordination of 
Development Corridors within the Department of Transport and Communications, which should 
be an umbrella bureau with one technical unit for every development/transport corridor in 
Mozambique, that is Maputo, Lubombo, Beira, Nacala and Zambezi River (interview with Dr. 
Alfredo Namitete). It seems that after a slow start, Mozambique has decided to pursue their 
corridor programme with substantial enthusiasm.9 
In the original plan, the Maputo Corridor Company (MCC) was supposed to manifest the 
institutionalisation of the MDC, be the legal entity at the local/provincial level and bring together 
local and business actors. It is considered important to have a formal institution that can handle 
the complex relationships in Southern Africa and that can provide technical assistance and 
programme and policy support for the corridor (SDI 1998a). The establishment of the MCC has 
been delayed owing to capacity constraints at local and provincial level, both amongst public and 
private actors, particularly in Mozambique but also in Mpumalanga. The envisaged activities of 
the MCC include: 
· Supporting the implementation of key infrastructure projects (road, rail, port, dredging, water, 
energy, etc.). 
· Supporting the implementation of key investment projects. 
· Information gathering and dissemination on investment opportunities and the investment 
environment. 
· The mobilisation of investment through project preparation and marketing. 
· Instituting a capacity building and policy research programme, based on actual projects. 
· Instituting a system to track progress in the MDC. 
The MCC should have a small staff, an Executive Committee and a Board of Directors 
constituted by regional private sector interests and the governments of South Africa, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, and ultimately Zimbabwe and Botswana. The Head Office should be 
located in Maputo, with an office in Nelspruit. This structure is yet to be established and until then 
Dave Arkwright serves as an interim manager (ibid). 
One interesting development in the MDC has been the emergence of The Borderlands 
Initiative, which is designed to stimulate increasing cooperation between towns and cities along 
the borders of South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique, and in the long-run also between 
participants from other SDIs and neighbouring countries (SDI 1998b). For various reasons there 
has not been full participation in the formal MDC processes by Swaziland, but it is interesting to 
note that Swaziland is involved in the Borderlands Initiative. This initiative, which has emerged 
without state involvement, seems to be the result of an institutional gap in the SDI programme 
and/or representing a situation where increased patterns of relationships creates both common 
interests and the need for more institutionalised cooperation in a bottom-up and spontaneous 
way. The Mpumalanga and Maputo provinces have endorsed the Borderlands Initiative, which is 
driven by the cities of Ressano Garcia and Komatipoort with the active support of the MCC (see 
Arkwright et al 1998). A number of technical committees in a range of economic sectors have 
                                                 
9 In this context it is worth mentioning that Dave Arkwright is moving into Mozambique in order to work with the Maputo 
Corridor Technical Unit in the Ministry of Transport and Communications.  
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been established on different sides of the border to facilitate transborder planning and 
development, for example physical and social infrastructure, transborder environmental issues, 
procedures for the border post (visas, customs, immigration and security). Efforts are also made to 
develop a tourism and biodiversity corridor between Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland 
(de Beer et al 1999: 13).   
5. Planning and implementation phases of the MDC 
Although each SDI has to adjust to the different conditions under which it operates, there are 
some basic similarities and at least the officials at the DTI now speak of a generalised ‘SDI 
methodology’. The special planning and implementation procedures are essential components of 
the SDI methodology, which have been developed in order to reflect the transnational character, 
the (extremely) short time-frame and the project-driven approach of the initiatives.  
There are two main phases, which can be further divided into sub-phases. The first main phase 
is driven by central government, OSDICC, CIC, the DTI Special Projects Directorate, the 
development finance institutions and the project managers, which gradually leads to the second 
stage, the exit strategy, whereby the initiative will be ‘handed over’ and then driven by provincial 
and local institutions, particularly the provincial investment promotion agencies (see SDI 1998c). 
There is considerable emphasis on ‘fast tracking’ project implementation, and the set-up, 
appraisal, packaging and launch of a SDI at the investors’ conference is supposed to be 
completed within 12 to 18 months. The exit strategy is given a little longer time; up to two years.  
The MDC involves various phases and sub-phases. The first thing to do in the setting up of a 
SDI is to appoint a project manager. The project manager organises an initial conceptual 
workshop and identifies promising sectors for investment, the main bottlenecks for development 
and the main investment opportunities in the area. The manager also sets up a technical team and 
a project identification team, made up of officials from government and parastatals as well as 
consultants and other relevant experts. Another main task of the project manager is to identify 
local ‘champions’ and stakeholders to provide the programme with legitimacy, and to ensure that 
there is an organisation, which can secure implementation upon the decentralisation of functions 
to provincial and local authorities (Jourdan 1998; cf. Hall 1998). 
After the set-up and pre-feasibility phase and the establishment of institutional structure, with 
political and technical teams etc., the process moves into the identification and ‘packaging’ of 
investment opportunities. Ideas for investment projects are widely solicited from local and 
provincial stakeholders. The main criterion for projects is that they must be ‘bankable’, that is offer 
a commercial viable return on investment. The DBSA and the IDC play a significant role in 
identifying and testing the feasibility of projects. The next task is to match potential domestic and 
international investors with investment opportunities and to raise the profile of the area as an 
international investment destination. This is typically done through the investors’ conference.  
After the MDC investors’ conference, which was held in May 1996, the technical team and 
project identification teams were dissolved. According to the stated SDI methodology, the MDC 
was supposed to be ‘handed over’ - through the so called ‘exit strategy’- to the provincial and 
local institutional structure, which should then continue identifying investment projects and 
matching them with potential investors. The implementation and planning phases of the MDC are 
shown in the Table 1 (see SDI 1998c).10  
                                                 
10 The MDC was initially developed along different lines by the Department of Transport when this so called SDI-methodology 
was developed by the DTI, under the leadership of Paul Jourdan. 
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Table 1. Implementation phases of the MDC. 
Phase  Activity 
1. Set Up  Appointment of project manager; gathering of socio-economic and 
institutional data on the loosely defined corridor area. 
2. Pre-Feasibility Pre-feasibility appraisal of data; organisation of conceptual workshop, 
development framework and spatial definition (led by project manager). 
3. Institutional Establishment of structures at the political, official and technical capacity 
levels, e.g. set-up of political team; interdepartmental team; technical team; 
working groups; identification of local champions. 
4. Feasibility Together with key stakeholders, further development of the conceptual 
framework into a terms of reference for more detailed appraisal.  
Identification and appraisal of lead projects and the developmental 
programme of action. DBSA and IDC play significant role in identifying and 
testing projects 
5. Packaging Finalisation of a detailed development perspective document, which 
indicates a list of viable projects and investment opportunities. 
6. Launch Launching of the MDC, at the investors conference, to present vision, 
objectives, perspective, anchor projects and investment opportunities; 
establishment of investment promotion mechanism and implementation 
capacity. Technical teams and project identification teams are dissolved. 
7. Exit Strategy Institutional arrangements to facilitate momentum and implementation of 
the initiative and the ‘hand over’ to provincial structure, e.g. the 
establishment of the Maputo Corridor Company and the consolidation of 
Provincial Investment Promotion Agencies. Establishment of clusters for 
selected sectors in the MDC area, which bring firms across the supply 
chain together and enhance their collective efficiencies. 
6. Institutional arrangements of the MDC: Strengths and weaknesses 
The aim of this Section is to make an inventory and assessment, from an institutional perspective, 
of the strength and weaknesses of the MDC. Due to the early stage of research and the dynamic 
nature of the MDC, the analysis will by be somewhat preliminary and conducted in an overview 
manner. The main purpose is to pinpoint some key aspects, positive and negative, in order to 
contribute to further research, discussion and policy-making. Needless to say, although 
comprehensive, the inventory is by no means exhaustive. The following aspects are highlighted:  
· Political champions. 
· The non-bureaucratic and ‘networked’ institutional structure. 
· The fast-tracking of design and implementation. 
· The management and institutional consequences of the contradictions in content of the 
MDC paradigm and strategy. 
· National and provincial relations. 
· Local participation and to what extent social demands and initiatives are absorbed.  
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6.1 Political champions 
The implementation of SDIs require considerable political commitment and political will by 
relevant levels of government. The political commitment provided by the political champions 
should increase coordination and integration between all involved government departments. It is 
probably impossible to mobilise a higher degree of political commitment to a development 
project than what has been ensured in the case of the MDC. The project has received political 
commitment not only from the very highest levels in the form of the two Presidents of the 
countries, but also from a number of highly-ranked politicians, such as President Mbeki, the 
Ministers of Transport in both countries, the Minister of Trade and Industry in South Africa, as well 
as the (former) Premier of Mpumalanga, Matthews Phosa. In addition, some influential ANC 
policy-makers such as Ketso Gordhan (Director General of the Department of Transport) and Paul 
Jourdan have ‘pushed’ the project. There is little doubt about the fact that this political 
commitment has contributed to effective decision-making and speedily implementation of the 
MDC.  
The strategy with political champions is particularly interesting in view of the more or less 
chronic difficulties associated with the implementation of most types of regional 
intergovernmental cooperation projects in Africa in the past. It appears that the high level of 
political commitment should be seen in light of the fact that the MDC has been a ‘test case’ of 
the SDI programme. It is no exaggeration that a ‘failure’ would possibly have undermined the 
whole SDI programme in both countries. The MDC simply ‘had to work’, and it was imperative to 
mobilise whatever political support needed to overcome the hurdles along the way. In 
Mozambique, the MDC in general and the Mozal project in particular, served as show-cases for 
proving that industrial projects could be implemented and be on time. According to this view it 
was more important that the Mozal was completed in time rather than that it managed to involve 
Mozambican contractors and labour to the largest possible extent. 
Exactly how important the high level of political commitment has been is difficult to estimate, 
but as one anonymous official stated: 
 ‘at one stage, the whole project was rapidly approaching crisis, which 
served as a major wake-up call for Mozambique, and a new more senior 
minister took over the Department of Transport … which led to the MDC 
receiving a boom overnight and was then almost driven by Mozambique’.  
In this context, it is important to take cognisance of the fact that South Africa’s ‘SDI programme 
no longer has the requisite political support to enable it to keep going as we know it’ (Arkwright, 
personal communication, 27 November 2000). In fact, Mozambique has wholeheartedly decided 
to pursue their corridor programme and the country may in fact become the driving force behind 
SDIs and regional development initiatives in SADC. 
Another example of the importance of political will and political champions, with a more 
negative result, is the change of Premier in Mpumalanga, succeeding Matthews Phosa who was 
very committed to the MDC. The new Premier, Ndaweni Mahlungu, has clearly other priorities 
than the MDC and projects associated with the legacy of Phosa. According to Jonathan Mitchell, 
‘the Corridor has collapsed as a provincial thing … the Committee [PTC] is officially restructured but 
basically the province has walked away from the process’ (Mitchell, interview). Another 
anonymous official confirms that ‘everything has changed because it was all linked to Phosa’. Now 
the MII is the only provincial institution involved in the MDC process. This shows that the 
institutional structure is weak as well as heavily dependent on what particular individual happens 
to be the political champion, thereby adding a striking amount of uncertainty to the process. 
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6.2 Network structure 
The institutional structure of the MDC is non-bureaucratic, with a more or less minimalist 
approach to institutions, and designed to meet the challenge of interdepartmental coordination 
and maintain flexibility and speed in planning and implementation. Although this structure 
consists of numerous committees, sub-committees, project and technical teams it builds mainly 
on existing institutional capacities and draws together capacities and policy-makers in a loosely 
organised and flexible network structure. 
One strength of this approach is that it has sustained interdepartmental cooperation, and ‘it is 
slowly teaching government departments to work together’ (Ismail and Jourdan in DTI 1998). 
However, even if it mainly seeks to build on existing institutional resources, progress depends on 
the quality and strength of these capacities. Such strategy is risky when skills and capacities do 
not exist or are weak, which is the reality not only in the provinces and Maputo but in fact also in 
several quarters in Gauteng. To a limited extent, this has been catered for and where there has 
been a lack of institutional capacities, the DTI has pushed to create them, for instance, a new 
PPP-unit in the Department of Finance and a new unit in the DBSA was created. But this has 
mainly been done at the central government level. And as Ismail and Jourdan point out: ‘This ad 
hoc institution building has happened as we’ve gone along, on a crisis management basis so far. 
This has to be more packaged than before’ (quoted in DTI 1998). This problem must not be taken 
lightly: it is perhaps the core institutional problem with the MDC.  
The current SDI/MDC methodology contains a minimalist or even ‘non-institutional’ 
perspective - to a large extent in line with the non-institutional understanding of society whereby 
institutions are seen as given, exogenous variables or at best instruments of reform. It deserves to 
be mentioned that MCC/Dave Arkwright have resisted this perspective and have relentlessly tried 
to build a more dense institutional landscape. Another problem with the network structure and 
the belief that policy-planning and policy-making can be done through existing resources is that 
the MDC ‘crowds-out’ time and resources, and are tying ministers as well as central government 
personnel down, which can damage other functions. 
Although there are a number of different committees and actors involved in the MDC process, 
there is a general lack of formal institutions and bureaucratic frameworks on both sides of the 
border (although this is/was particularly deep on the Mozambican side). Many committees and 
task teams are temporary in nature. The result is that there is no organisational and legal 
structure/entity that represents and takes responsibility for the MDC, perhaps apart from the 
project manager. The network structure lacks a clear ‘organisational’ centre and it is actually 
ambiguous as to who the ‘driver’ of the MDC process is. It is difficult to track the centre of 
decision-making and power as well as to understand where responsibility and accountability are. 
The DTI is obviously a main player but it does not seek responsibility since it wants to ‘hand over’ 
the initiative to the province, whereas the province on its side has not been part of the design and 
build up of the MDC and feels it does not ‘own’ the initiative. It is worth noticing that according 
to the South African project manager, Dave Arkwright, one lesson for the future is that ‘it needs to 
be established who is carrying the Corridor’.  
Another problem is that the MDC/SDI strategy depends heavily upon the use of informal 
power and ‘political capital’ in order to ensure progress. ‘The bureaucratic dangers inherent in this 
approach are obvious; a guiding SDI policy statement notes “that there is always a risk of allowing 
certain key role players, including government departments, to get left behind in the process, 
thereby creating the impression of exclusivity”…’ (footnote 12 in Hall 1998). In other words, the 
informal network structure is mainly ‘designed’ and effective for those inside rather than those 
outside the network. As discussed in Section 6.5, the provinces have not been included in the 
network. According to one interviewee: 
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 ‘initially the Department of Transport took an enlightened stance and 
understood that the Province needed support … while the DTI works under 
the assumption that the Province cannot do anything’ (Mitchell interview).  
6.3 Fast-tracking … or slow-tracking? 
A quick planning and implementation process is essential to the development of the MDC. The 
MDC management team identifies obstacles and then speedily mobilises political support from 
the political champions in order to generate momentum and facilitate ‘delivery’. Fast-tracking is 
‘like rowing a canoe with holes - if you stop you sink’ (Ismail and Jourdan in DTI 1998).  
The strength of this strategy, when - and if - it works, is obviously that it quickly delivers the 
goods. Through its speed and ability to establish a link between input/effort and output/delivery, 
it provides a strategy for implementation and gives concrete meaning to the process of regional 
cooperation and integration in a way that many other comprehensive projects have failed to do 
in the past.  
‘The main strength of the SDI methodology is that it has brought a new 
approach, through a precise set of steps, which could get things moving’ 
(Arkwright, interview).  
According to the project manager in Mozambique, one strength of the strategy is that  
‘it started to challenge things … and brought new things to Mozambique … 
back in 1995 it seems that such push-approach was actually needed’ 
(Soares, interview).  
Nevertheless, Franscisca Soares also argues that in certain respects the speed has been too fast 
for Mozambique, especially with regard to the inclusion in the process of the non-governmental 
actors (Soares, interview). Jonathan Mitchell claims that the extreme emphasis on speed has been 
counter-productive, and, according to him, ‘the fast-track approach is slower than a slow-track 
approach’ (Mitchell, interview). This is so because the design and implementation must be so 
quick that there exists no time for rational and bureaucratic decision-making which is adjusted to 
local conditions and the interests of concerned actors and institutions. The extremely rapid design 
and decision-making process is particularly problematic in a context with low institutional 
capacities (such as those in Mpumalanga and Mozambique). Officials involved in the MDC 
project such as Jon Mitchell and Dave Arkwright both emphasise the need for the development 
of institutions and management systems which can ensure a more coherent and well-thought out 
policy- and decision-making process. 
The fast-tracking approach is risky also for the quality of performance of capital investments by 
the private and public sectors. To offset these risks, the government has mobilised considerable 
technical expertise from both the public and private sectors to back-up the process, mainly in the 
form of consultancy and expert teams. Although such expert teams are important, the proclaimed 
‘urgency’ has not allowed any time for discussing the content of the MDC project and letting all 
parties understand what the MDC actually is about and what it is not. The MDC has essentially 
been designed at the drawing tables in Gauteng and quickly enforced in a top-down manner, 
without ensuring that provincial and local actors are integrated and consulted.  
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6.4 Contradictions in content 
There has circulated a number of different understandings regarding the aims, strategies and 
methodologies of the MDC. There is a confusion about whether the MDC should be portrayed as 
an ‘investment initiative’ or a ‘development corridor’. These contradictions cause uncertainties 
and ineffectiveness in the management of the MDC.   
In spite of its label as a development corridor, the MDC approach is built around the key goal 
to ‘crowd-in’ private investments. It is only to a minor extent a planning exercise (that is allocation 
of public resources). Basically it is about ‘investment attraction’ and ‘market guidance’, whereby 
the state suggests opportunities to the private sector, with the hope that it will create jobs. As 
stated in the proceedings of a workshop on SDIs in South Africa and Southern Africa: ‘The nearest 
paradigm to this is what was in last year’s World Development Report on market guidance. SDIs are 
textbook World Bank stuff’ (DTI 1998). The former regional SDI coordinator, Margarida Martins, 
confirmed that a lot of confusion on the content of the MDC is a consequence of that it 
(according to her) should be understood as an investment initiative rather than a development 
corridor (Martins, interview, 16 March 1999).  
One main problem is that the MDC has been marketed and ‘sold’ to the public as a mechanism 
to bring ‘development’; a transport corridor in which ‘social development’, jobs within a holistic, 
participatory and environmentally framework are supposed to blossom. This contradiction (and 
premature creation of huge expectations) is the result of a deep rift between rhetoric and 
practical implementation. More specifically, there is a gap between the attention and resources 
devoted to the achievement of key objectives 1 and 2 (to rehabilitate the primary infrastructure 
and to maximise investment), compared to key objectives 3 and 4 (to maximise social 
development and job creation, and ensure a holistic, participatory and environmentally 
sustainable approach to development). It should be acknowledged that the MDC has been 
successful in the rehabilitation of primary infrastructure and crowding-in of some ‘bankable’ 
investments in the corridor, but it is clear that key objectives 3 and 4 are more or less squeezed 
into the MDC framework only insofar as they are compatible with the other two objectives.  
Needless to say, some mechanisms and resources are in place to support key objectives 3 and 
4. Regarding the former there is an emphasis on:  
· Minimum proportion (value) of contract to emerging business. 
· Cluster processes. 
· Targeted interventions to support SMMEs, including a corridor equity fund.  
With regard to the latter it is claimed that this should be sustained by:  
· The establishment of the MCC. 
· A support programme, which includes a Strategic Environmental Management Plan (SEMP), a 
Local Economic Development (LED) programme aimed at supporting local government in 
maximizing corridor opportunities, a SMMEs study to develop strategic direction and identify 
projects, and an agricultural study to develop strategic direction and identify projects. 
· A training programme (mainly) for public sector managers in project and programme 
management (SDI 1998a).  
The problem is that these processes are underdeveloped and their impact on social 
development, job creation and a holistic and participatory framework are by no means in 
proportion to the attention devoted to key objective 1 and 2. Professor Henry Bernstein 
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emphasises that the SDIs are large investment initiatives and ‘employment generation per se is 
NOT an objective nor is local development more generally’ (Bernstein 1999: 10).11 
It is important to recognise that there is a debate over the content of aims, objectives and 
methodologies of the MDC even at the highest level of policy-making. It is well-known amongst 
those following the MDC processes that Dave Arkwright has relentlessly tried to emphasise the 
development-oriented dimensions of the MDC. Arkwright points out that he has always been 
 ‘under pressure to conform to the focused SDI approach, to concentrate 
only on investment projects and to leave other development issues to others. 
I resisted this because I considered it important to create a proper base for 
the big investments.  Hence the reason why we created a support 
programme (including SEMP, SMME, LED, etc), why we established a 
training programme etc …’ (personal communication, 27 November 2000).  
In defence of the official MDC strategy, it should be pointed out that the extremely high 
expectations placed on the MDC have made it difficult to inform stakeholders and the public 
about its actual content (regardless of how it should be defined). This confusion has then been 
further escalated by the fact that some politicians and policy-makers, especially in Mpumalanga 
province, have a poor understanding of the content and strategy of the MDC. According to 
Jonathan Mitchell, ‘neither politicians nor the citizenry understand PPPs or the Corridor’ and ‘in 
Nelspruit there is no understanding or conception what the Corridor is about’ (Mitchell, interview). 
In Mozambique, there has been a discussion on whether a different strategy and methodology is 
more appropriate for the Mozambican conditions and preferences. The MDC has also been 
undermined by the fact that some provincial politicians have criticised certain aspects of the 
MDC, such as the toll fees, and then proclaimed that they are going to change them (Mitchell, 
interview). This might perhaps be blamed on political populism (or incompetence) but it might 
also be explained by the fact that architects of the MDC have not made enough effort to ‘inform’ 
(or ‘educate’) the provinces or citizenry on the content of MDC, thus illustrating a poor 
relationship between national government and the province/citizenry; issues which are now 
attended to.  
6.5 National and provincial relations 
As mentioned previously, a network of national institutions was the driving force of the first main 
phase of the MDC, whereas, through the ‘exit strategy’, the MDC is to be ‘handed over’ and 
provincial and local institutions were to become the driving forces of the second main phase of 
administration and implementation. There are a number of important problems related to this 
proposed handing over and decentralisation strategy. 
The MDC strategy is centralistic and top-down in nature and does not seek to substantially 
integrate the provinces until the exit strategy. As discussed previously, central government and to 
a large extent the development finance institutions such as DBSA and IDC have neither been 
enthusiastic nor successful in integrating and involving provincial and local governments and 
institutions in policy- and decision-making. It should be noted that there is/was a fundamental 
difference between the way the Department of Transport and the DTI handle(d) relationships 
with the provinces. According to Jonathan Mitchell, the former  
‘actively sought to provide impetus to the province, but when the SDI Unit 
at the DTI took over the process was centralised’ (Mitchell, interview).  
                                                 
11 See Lundin and Söderbaum (2001), Söderbaum and Taylor (2000) and Taylor (1999) for studies on the on ‘development’ 
impact of the MDC initiative. 
 
 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s p e c t s  o f  t h e  M D C  
 15
15 
In a study of Richards Bay, which is highly relevant also for the case of MDC, Peter Hall (1998) 
shows that the existing regional context and institutional structure is both the cause and the 
means to a solution of the development dilemma. Hall criticises the extreme emphasis in the SDI 
methodology on the preparation and crowding-in of external investment projects, which enhances 
a dangerous national-provincial relation and also give rise to the misconception that there is no 
endogenous growth dynamic in the SDI area. Hall suggests a more appropriate role for national 
policy in regional/provincial development, with a new relationship between the national and the 
regional/provincial, whereby agencies such as the national departments, the national 
conglomerates, Portnet and the IDC operate better at the regional/provincial level.  
‘The challenge for the SDI Office in the DTI is to convince these agencies to 
provide the correct incentives for changes in the relationships of key local 
organisations and actors’ (Hall 1998: 14).  
This argument is similar to the one put forward by Amin (1998) as well as Lewis and Bloch’s 
suggestion that  
‘cluster initiatives and other industrial support programmes to enhance 
competitiveness need to develop a clearer regional focus, and that the SDIs 
need to design their mechanisms with a greater emphasis on strengthening 
regional agglomerations and clusters’ (Lewis and Bloch 1997: 753).12 
One set of problems with the centralised design and decision-making are related to the 
investors’ conference. In the SDI approach a lot of effort was put into the design and packaging 
of investment projects, which where then presented at the investors’ conference. However, 
provincial and local actors have not been integrated into identification and design of these 
projects, which seems to have created a lot of inefficiencies. Gordon Griffiths, the CEO of the 
MII, claims that  
‘it is embarrassing to market and present the projects inherited from the 
investors’ conference. The investors’ conference was more like a wishing list 
… the MII does not know the details of these projects …  and the projects 
were not adjusted to local conditions’ (Griffiths, interview).  
Instead of presenting the projects from the investors’ conference, the MII concentrates on the 
cluster processes and downstream production. Gordon Griffiths argue that there was  
‘bad sequencing of the MDC approach … and even if the MII was not 
created at such early stage … the MII ought to have been involved much 
earlier in the process’ (Griffiths, interview).13  
                                                 
12 There are six clusters in Mpumalanga, namely stainless steel; chemical and chemical products; agro-food processing; agro-
products; wood products and furniture; and tourism. 
13 The SDI methodology has changed over time to place more attention to the cluster processes. However it is worth noticing that 
Gordon Griffiths argues for a decentralised approach while the DTI seems to argue for a more centralised approach, as seen in 
the following comment by Ismail and Jourdan (DTI 1998: 5): ‘The biggest change in the SDI process has been increased 
emphasis on cluster initiatives. Setting up industrial cluster organisations is part of the exit strategy. It is the main way of making 
permanent local linkages in SDIs. Clusters work best at local level (rather than national level). This is where you deal best with 
the “soft issues”. Although cluster initiatives are seen as part of the exit strategy, they merge with other parts of the SDI. 
Functioning cluster organisations will be transferred to the sectoral directorates in the DTI, and will become their responsibility. 
Cluster organisations are where we’re putting in the institutional memory and the long-term institution building attached to the 
SDI program. The key actors in the cluster process are government, capital and labour, but you do bring in others, e.g. 
universities. DTI kick-starts the process, and then the others take it over gradually.’ The argument raised in this paper is that it is 
doubtful whether the ‘new’ approach proclaimed by Ismail and Jourdan changes any of the fundamentals of the MDC 
methodology. The problematic relationship between national versus provincial/local actors and institutions remains basically the 
same.  
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Furthermore, the strategy is centred around the notion that in order to maintain fast-track 
delivery, the province or locally constituted public ‘partners’ can be ‘by-passed’ or side-stepped if 
they are deemed ‘unfit’ for one reason or another, such as being ‘too political’, lacking capacity, 
competence, vision and commitment etc. According to Bernstein (1998),  
‘this marks one clear limitation of SDIs, namely that they can contribute to 
institutional capacity (for example inter-Departmental liaison and co-
ordination, local planning and management capacity, human resource 
development) when initial conditions are relatively favourable, but not when 
local development requires more gradual/evolutionary and more “political” 
(participatory) processes of institution building’.  
In effect such ‘by-pass’ means that the proposed decentralisation strategy is reversed. 
According to Jonathan Mitchell,  
‘the MDC is actually centralised rather than decentralised’ (Mitchell, 
interview).  
6.6 Local participation 
There has been very limited communication between central government actors on the one hand 
and local governments, communities, the private sector, various interest groups, organised labour 
and the citizenry on the other hand. ‘It is a paradox that, although the Corridor is well-known 
nationally and internationally, many local communities which will be directly affected by the 
development have very little information about the project’ (Mitchell 1998: 760). The official view 
from the SDI Unit within DTI is that there is some degree of ‘participation’ and that the SDIs are 
supposed to deal with locals to some extent, but that ‘it is not a deep-rooted participatory process’ 
(Ismail and Jourdan in DTI 1998). Local participation is supposed to come in only through the 
‘exit strategy’, but then the problem is that this eliminates the stakeholders from the basic design 
and prioritisation of projects. This conflicts with key objective 4, namely that the MDC is 
supposed to be a participatory process.  
The analysis in this paper suggests that the institutional network structure is reasonably 
‘inclusive’ and open for central government institutions and (capable and resource-rich) actors (in 
the national departments, DBSA, IDC, Investment South Africa, CSIR and so forth) but that it is 
rather ‘closed’ and exclusive with regard to (weaker) actors and people outside the network. In 
essence, the network structure is designed for ‘insiders’ and does not work very well for 
‘outsiders’. Its purpose is to implement gigantic investment projects and to deal with a few dozen 
‘big’ investors rather than large groups of dispossessed people at the local level. Local 
participation is equally badly served by the provincial government:  
‘Mpumalanga’s economic affairs department agrees that the small man [sic] 
has not always featured significantly in the Maputo Corridor planning’ (Mail 
and Guardian, 15 June 1998).  
In this context it should also be mentioned that the investors’ conference is intended to create 
opportunities for small- and medium-size businesses, in the way that local businesses are 
encouraged to network and form joint ventures with foreign and non-local investors. This has not 
worked satisfactorily and it is appears that in the current design, the MDC is not well suited for 
the inclusion of the local market demands and the social forces. 
Some policy-makers recognise that the lack of local participation constitutes a serious 
deficiency of the MDC. In order to meet this challenge, the Mpumalanga provincial government 
was trying to develop a comprehensive communication strategy, together with an innovative 
community tracking system, but this was suddenly ended with the changes in the provincial 
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leadership. The question of local participation is not just about a democratic instinct. It also 
means that problems are created which sooner or later have to be dealt with (which is once again 
illustrating a situation where the fast-track in effect becomes a slow-track).  
Before concluding, it should be recognised that there have been many types of local protests 
against the MDC. The protests are the result of the way the MDC project has been designed and 
implemented from the very beginning. Perhaps the most contentious issue of local participation is 
the N4 toll road. Many local residents are outraged that placing tolls on the N4 will separate them 
from their schools, jobs and the main shopping centres, for instance in Nelspruit. According to the 
local Federated Long and Local Distance Taxi Association, the ‘organisation [was] not invited to 
any decision-making meetings about the toll gates’ (Mail and Guardian, 15 June 1998). After a 
protracted dispute with the operators of the toll route, concessions were granted to local 
residents, who now pay reduced (though the prices remain disputed) rates for using the N4. This 
transforms the N4 from a genuine public good, to a private or at least quasi-public road (good). It 
is also remarkable that the prices seem to have been imposed upon locals (arbitrarily) by private 
concerns, with little regard for the social (and collective) implications of such financial 
impositions. An argument confirmed by Gordon Griffiths, who argues for deeper societal 
cost/benefit-analysis of the toll roads, because excessive tolls seem to create social dilemmas as 
they do not deliver the public good and/or may ruin the secondary roads instead (Griffiths, 
interview). Another example is that the rural local women were chased off the N4 for trying to sell 
fruit (something they have done for decades).14 There has been minimal consultation with local 
communities over such issues and only really enacted when effected local inhabitants complain, 
leading to what Tim Shaw (1999) refers to as the MDCs ‘democratic deficit’. As Mozal’s chairman, 
Rob Barbour, correctly points out, fundamental questions need to be asked vis-à-vis the ownership 
of the micro-region (Business Day, 4 October 1999). 
6.7 Summary 
The interesting role played by the political champions was the first key aspect to be analysed in 
this Section. The MDC has received extensive political support, and the political champions have 
intervened and speeded up decision-making and implementation when the process otherwise 
arguably would have stagnated. When champions are strong, this is of course a great asset, but as 
illustrated by the case of the new Premier in Mpumalanga, Mahlungu, weak champions may 
undermine the whole process. This is risky in that it makes the process heavily dependent on the 
commitment and competence of certain individuals.  
The network structure has several strengths. It is flexible, facilitates a quick planning and 
decision-making process and ensures interdepartmental coordination and cooperation. It is 
furthermore non-bureaucratic and probably relatively cheap in that it builds on existing 
institutional capacities and resources. On the other hand, the strategy is risky when there is a lack 
of skills, competence and institutional capacities, that is the normal realities of countries and 
provinces grouped in the corridor. It may also crowd-out time and resources from other functions. 
More serious drawbacks are that the network structure creates a rather diffuse power and 
responsibility structure without a clear centre of decision-making, and it is not particularly suited 
to carry out conventional bureaucratic procedures. In essence, the network structure does not 
seek to develop a more long-lasting institutional landscape or organisational centre. 
The emphasis on fast-tracking is essential to the MDC approach and the SDI methodology more 
generally. To the extent that it is working there are some obvious advantages, for instance that it 
creates visible benefits and establishes a connection between input and output. It may also spur a 
certain ‘multiplier effect’ and a kick-start to the economy. On the other hand, there is some 
                                                 
14 See Taylor (2000) for a more detailed analysis of local participation in the establishment and decision-making of PPPs and the 
N4 toll road.  
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evidence in this study that the fast-track approach may in fact be counter-productive, ‘a slow-
track’, with negative influences on the management of the MDC as well as the quality of 
investment projects, implying that institutional components and policies may have to be 
redesigned in order to match local conditions and the realities on the ground.  
The MDC has a lot to offer to a host of stakeholders, especially insofar as it manages to bring 
together public, private and central and local actors. On paper, the aims and objectives of the 
MDC are impressive, but there is a wide rift between rhetoric and practical implementation; 
between the emphasis placed on bankable investment projects in contrast to social development, 
job creation and a participatory and holistic development strategy. The contradiction in content is 
obviously a weakness and undermines the credibility and functioning of the MDC. The MDC is 
officially held to be a development corridor but in practice, it is an investment and market 
guidance initiative with the hope that it will create jobs and lead to ‘development’. The theoretical 
and empirical evidence backing up such automatic spread effects is weak, particularly under 
conditions such as those prevailing in Mpumalanga and Mozambique.  
The national-provincial relation is yet another institutional flaw of the MDC. Central government 
institutions have pushed the project and due to capacity constraints on the provincial and local 
level the assumed ‘urgency’ has left these actors outside of design and implementation. There is a 
poor (and sometimes even non-existing) relationship between central government/institutions 
and provincial institutions. The network structure is diffuse and has created exclusiveness when 
key role-players are by-passed when they do not conform with the SDI-strategy, that is 
cooperation and communication is facilitated within the network but not with outsiders and only 
in a top-down manner. In spite of attempts made at decentralisation during the early stages when 
the Department of Transport coordinated the MDC project, there was a re-centralisation of 
decision-making and implementation when the DTI took over as main sponsor of the process. 
Due to the fact that the Mpumalanga government deliberately has withdrawn and ‘killed’ the 
MDC at the provincial level, this is not necessarily a weakness from an administrative point of 
view. However, it sustains the view the MDC is perceived as something ‘external’ and imposed 
from above, which may prevent the MDC from moving beyond anything else but a gigantic 
investment project.  
The fact that the MDC is better known internationally and nationally than locally combined with 
the fact that it is not designed to involve bottom-up forces and facilitate local participation 
questions the ownership of the micro-region and gives it a ‘democratic deficit’. These problems 
must not be ignored, but may actually undermine the role of the state. Similarly to several other 
African countries and somewhat ironically resembling the apartheid state, which was an 
instrument in the hands of the Whites, the new ‘neo-liberal’ state may be looked upon as an 
‘external’ agent, implementing top-down projects in alliance with international investors rather 
than its own citizenry (cf. Söderbaum and Taylor 2000). 
7. Lessons for development corridors and SDIs in Southern Africa 
In spite of its short history there is now a discussion on whether the South African SDI 
methodology can be applied to the broader Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
region. The South African government is enthusiastic about the potential of SDIs and has offered 
to aid regional SDIs throughout the SADC region by transferring the lessons learned and the skills 
gained during the execution of the SDIs in South Africa. Although also for other reasons, the 
mandate of the DBSA, as well as the IDC have now been extended to cover the whole SADC 
region, and these institutions are likely to be involved in one way or the other in the 
implementation of regional SDIs. However, South Africa’s engagement in the region and in 
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promoting such SDIs is very contentious and sensitive. The Mbeki government does not seem to 
be willing to pursue the regional issues as much as the earlier players did. As a consequence, 
instead of the hub-and-spoke approach to regional SDIs originally advocated by South Africa, we 
are in fact witnessing a backing off by South Africa, seemingly in favour of a more 
multilateral/regional approach to SDIs, probably within the framework of SADC. Time will tell 
whether such approach actually will take off.  
To draw the lessons for future development corridors and SDIs in Southern Africa is not an easy 
task. It is also somewhat speculative, since it depends not only on the interpretation of the MDC 
as such, but of course also on the qualities and objectives of the particular regional SDI which is 
talked about.15 In drawing such lessons it is logical to roughly concentrate on the key aspects that 
were emphasised in the analysis of the MDC.  
One main lesson of the MDC is that any SDI seems to require considerable political 
commitment and political will provided by the political champions. Considering the centralised 
decision-making structure in most SADC countries, it appears that the political champions must 
be in the highest centres of decision-making, preferably a key minister or even the president. A 
weak champion may in fact ruin the whole process, since otherwise decisions and policies might 
not be taken or implemented. It is thus likely that serious problems will arise if the political 
champion is not in charge of one of the main line departments driving the process.  
Furthermore, in the past many large-scale economic projects in Africa have been heavily 
politicised, which has prevented efficient decision-making and implementation. Needless to say, 
‘the political game must be played’ but it is important that the process does not get tied up into 
never-ending political ‘struggles’. According to a SDI Position Paper:  
‘There is constant pressure for the selection of SDI’s to be politicised in the 
interests of provincial equity or other local constituencies. This poses the 
greatest threat to the future of the SDI’s because, if investors suspect that the 
process is moving away from sound economic principles, the key aspect of 
investment “crowding-in” will rapidly be lost and the whole strategy will be 
seriously compromised. Thus the politicisation of the section of SDI’s needs 
to be vigorously opposed’ (Jourdan et al, quoted in DTI, 1997: 7).  
This proposition is relevant in that it pinpoints the problems inherent in excessive politicisation. 
However, it is equally important to avoid the pitfall of reducing everything to economics, 
especially the trend in the MDC whereby ‘development’ and ‘sound economic principles’ are 
reduced to ‘bankable investment projects’.  
As explained previously, there are certain strengths with the network structure , such as that it 
ensures a quick and flexible planning and decision-making process. The structure draws together 
capacities and policy-makers in a loosely organised and flexible network, which innovatively 
enhances interdepartmental coordination. The network structure is particularly interesting in light 
of the fact that while conventional states-driven regional ventures have proved to be rather 
cumbersome and rigid, the MDC as a governance mechanism involves a more limited number of 
partners and is more flexible, thus offering greater scope for experimentation and speed in 
changing operations. Having stated this, it must be more deeply assessed whether the fluid, 
loosely structured and informal network structure is suitable for the existing bureaucratic and 
institutional realities in the neighbouring countries. As suggested by the experience of 
                                                 
15 A number of potential and possible SDIs and development corridors have been identified (by South Africa) in the SADC 
region: Walvis Bay (Namibia, which is already completed); Malange (Angola); Lobito (Angola and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, ultimately Zambia); Namibe (Angola and Namibia); Okavango-Upper Zambezi (Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe); Tazara (Zambia and Tanzania); Nacala (Mozambique and Malawi, ultimately Zambia); Beira (Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe); and the Mozambique-Zambezi River (see SDI 2000a).  
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Mozambique in the case of the MDC, patterns of decision-making about major resources are 
often centralised which may lead to problems with practical implementation within a network 
structure. By the same token, the interdepartmental coordination and cooperation in the South 
African SDI programme may not be working in some of the other SADC countries, where often 
the presidents need to get things going (DTI 1998). The network structure requires that the 
institutions and capacities are strong, capable and competent, which was not the case in 
Mpumalanga and Mozambique (and to some extent not on the central national level in South 
Africa either), and therefore the actors in these locations experienced problems. Due to the fact 
that the institutional capacities in many neighbouring countries are weaker than in South Africa 
(including Mpumalanga), the viability of the network structure has to be more deeply assessed. In 
the process of building regional SDIs, it seems that there must be a stronger focus on both formal 
and informal institutional capacity building than what has been the case in the MDC. A closely 
related proposition is to create a more structured ‘organisation’ that takes responsibility for the 
process, provides a legal and regulatory framework and becomes a recognised ‘driver’.  
In view of the clear risk that many large-scale projects tend to stagnate, fast-tracking is positive in 
the sense that it maintains momentum and provides stakeholders with a link between input and 
outcome. However, the institutional limitations and political realities in the SADC countries 
suggest that it might be very difficult to sustain the high speed emphasised in the SDI 
methodology. Instead of a multiplier effect and kick-start, a fast-tracked SDI faces the risk of being 
yet another major project with no or few local links and disentangled from the realities on the 
ground. As suggested by the MDC, the high speed may also have negative repercussions on the 
quality of investment.  
Any contradiction in content is obviously a weakness and undermines the credibility of the SDI 
in question as well as the ‘state’ more generally. Management and institutional effectiveness are 
obviously compromised when stakeholders and not even key policy-makers within the particular 
project manage to agree on the aims, methodologies and strategies. In this regard, the MDC 
provides a negative example for other SDIs in Southern Africa. The MDC is officially held to be a 
development corridor, but in practice it is a huge investment and market guidance initiative. The 
theoretical and empirical evidence backing up such automatic and Big-Bang spread effects under 
conditions such as those in Mpumalanga, Mozambique and other SADC countries are not 
persuasive. More research and discussion is needed regarding whether investment initiatives and 
market guidance is the way forward for the SADC countries. It is possible that ‘development’ 
should be a more guiding principle of the initiatives in SADC, and if this is the case the whole SDI 
methodology is challenged (because it is designed for investment initiatives and not for job 
creation and participatory development). 
There is also a need to diversify the picture of what type of SDI one is trying to create. There 
are in fact a number of different types of SDIs, each with very different characteristics and each 
situated in dramatically different contexts. Some may have a very high potential, while others 
have a lower potential. Some are simply transport routes, while others are similar to the MDC, 
(although none seem to have as good potential as the MDC). The argument raised here is that 
there is a need to specify the differences and similarities between the regional SDIs in order to 
not create an illusion that they all have the same potential or will be able to generate large-scale 
‘development’.  
The national-provincial relation constituted a weak link in the MDC. In the case of the MDC, this 
lack of provincial and local participation leads to a lack of ownership as well as a ‘democratic 
deficit‘. As suggested by the case of the MDC a top-down and centralised strategy is both 
ineffective and meets resistance. The handing over and exit strategy did not work satisfactorily in 
the case of the MDC and in other regional SDIs these aspects need to be rethought. It is a fact 
that the provincial and local levels are much weaker in the SADC region than in South Africa, 
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which makes it an even greater challenge to try to build local participation and give ownership at 
the provincial and local levels. It is clear that there is a need for a new regional SDI methodology. 
The best solution is to find a sound balance between top-down and bottom-up strategies which 
allow a certain degree of provincial and local participation at earlier stages in the process. This 
would also imply making institution- and capacity-building an integral part of the SDI from the 
outset. However, unless there is commitment and resources for empowering the provincial and 
local levels and people living in the particular SDI area one radical alternative might be to ‘keep’ 
the SDI as a top-down and centralistic programme but no false illusions should be made that the 
provincial and local actors suddenly will have the capacity and commitment to carry out a 
programme they only have been involved in at the very latest stages and in the exit strategy.  
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Appendix: List of interviewees 
David Arkwright, MDC Project Manager, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
Gordon Griffiths, Chief Executive Officer, Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, Nelspruit, April 4, 
2000. 
Domenico Liuzzi, Coordinator of KULIMA non-governmental organisation, Maputo, April 6, 
2000. 
Iraê Baptista Lundin, researcher at the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionals, Maputo, April 
7, 2000. 
Margarida Martins, regional SDI coordinator, DTI Special Projects Unit, Pretoria, 16 March 1999. 
Jonathan Mitchell, Economist, Special Projects and Policy Unit, Mpumalanga Province, Nelspruit 
April 5, 2000. 
Alfredo Namitete (Dr.), Chairman, Committee of Senior Officials, Southern African Transport and 
Communications Commission, Maputo, April 6, 2000. 
Milissão Nvunga, lecturer at the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionals, Maputo, April 7, 
2000. 
Francisca Henriqueta Soares, MDC Project Manager, Mozambican Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, Maputo, April 10, 2000. 
Greg White, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Halfway House, Gauteng, April 14, 2000. 
Bodil Wikman, Coordinator of Link NGO Forum, non-governmental umbrella organisation, 
Maputo, April 6, 2000. 
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